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Abstract  
A majority of older Finns withdraw from employment via early retirement 
schemes years before the statutory retirement age. Over the past 15 years, a series 
of policy reforms have been introduced to reduce the widespread use of early exit 
pathways. By exploiting variation in eligibility rules between different cohorts, 
this study examines the effects of changes in the eligibility age thresholds for 
unemployment and part-time pension schemes and the effect of tightening medi-
cal criteria for disability pension eligibility. The findings imply that these re-
forms have jointly raised the average age at which older workers leave 
employment by 3.9 months. This increase is mainly due to a sharp drop in dis-
ability pension enrolment from age 58 upwards and to a lower incidence of un-
employment at younger ages. The policy effects are found to be heterogeneous, 
so that different subgroups were affected by different reforms. 
Key words: Early retirement, policy reform, disability, unemployment 
JEL classification numbers: J14, J26  
Tiivistelmä  
Valtaosa ikääntyneistä poistuu työmarkkinoilta varhaiseläkereittien kautta useita 
vuosia ennen virallista vanhuuseläkeikää. Viimeisten 15 vuoden aikana on toteu-
tettu useita reformeja, joilla on pyritty suitsimaan varhaiseläkkeiden käyttöä.  
Reformien seurauksena eri vuosina syntyneet henkilöt ovat tulleet varhaiseläke-
reittien piiriin eri ikäisinä. Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään tätä vaihtelua syntymä-
kohorttien välillä arvioitaessa, miten työttömyyseläkeputken ja osa-aikaeläkkeen 
ikärajojen nostot sekä yksilöllisen varhaiseläkkeen lakkauttaminen ovat vaikutta-
neet työuriin. Tulosten mukaan uudistukset yhdessä ovat pidentäneet työuria 
keskimäärin 3,9 kuukautta. Taustalla on työkyvyttömyysriskin alentuminen 58 
vuoden iästä ylöspäin sekä työttömyysriskin alentuminen nuoremmalla iällä. Eri 
reformit ovat vaikuttaneet eri työntekijäryhmiin erilailla. 
Asiasanat: Varhaiseläke, politiikkamuutos, työkyvyttömyys, työttömyys 
JEL-luokittelu: J14, J26 

  
 
Yhteenveto 
Valtaosa suomalaisista poistuu työmarkkinoilta ennen aikojaan varhaiseläkereit-
tien kautta. Siksi keskimääräinen eläkeikä on jo pitkään ollut hieman alle 60 eli 
reilusti alle virallisen vanhuuseläkeiän. Suuri osa ikääntyneistä on siirtynyt joko 
työkyvyttömyys- tai työttömyysperusteisille etuuksille. Lisäksi osa-aikaeläke on 
mahdollistanut osittaisen vetäytymisen työelämästä. Eläkejärjestelmän taloudelli-
sen kestävyyden kannalta varhaiseläkkeiden suosio on huolestuttavaa, koska 
vanhuushuoltosuhteen (yli 64-vuotiaiden suhde 15–64-vuotiaisiin) arvioidaan 
nousevan nykyisestä 26 prosentista 45 prosenttiin vuoteen 2030 mennessä.  
Suomessa vallitsee varsin laaja konsensus siitä, että ikääntyneiden tulisi jatkaa 
työssä nykyistä pidempään. Valtiovallan ja työmarkkinajärjestöjen mukaan kes-
kimääräistä eläkeikää pitäisi saada nostetuksi vähintään kolmella vuodella (v. 
2008 tasosta) vuoteen 2025 mennessä.1 Varhaiseläkereittien ehtoja onkin jo kiris-
tetty monella tapaa, mutta tuskin riittävästi. Vaikka tavoitteesta oltaisiinkin yhtä 
mieltä, käsitykset lisätoimien tarpeellisuudesta ja eri toimenpiteiden tehokkuu-
desta vaihtelevat. Tämä tutkimus pyrkii antamaan eväitä eläkekeskusteluun tar-
joamalla tietoa siitä, miten eräät vuosina 1997–2003 toteutetut uudistukset ovat 
vaikuttaneet työssä pysymiseen. Näiden uudistusten vaikutusten perusteella voi-
daan myös arvioida tuoreempien uudistusten todennäköisiä vaikutuksia. Aivan 
viime vuosina tehtyjen eläkereformien vaikutuksista ei vielä ole saatavilla suoraa 
empiiristä evidenssiä, koska uudistuksiin liittyy tyypillisesti pitkiä siirtymäaikoja 
ja koska tarvittavat tilasto-aineistot saadaan tutkimuskäyttöön vasta muutamien 
vuosien viiveellä. 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan muutoksia kolmessa varhaiseläkereitissä: työttö-
myyseläkeputkessa, työkyvyttömyyseläkkeessä ja osa-aikaeläkkeessä. Työttö-
myyseläkeputki koostui työttömyysturvan lisäpäivistä ja niitä seuranneesta 
työttömyyseläkkeestä. Vuonna 1997 työttömyyseläkeputken alaikärajaa nostet-
tiin kahdella vuodella 55:een. Osa-aikaeläkkeen tavoitteena on edistää työssä 
jaksamista tarjoamalla taloudellista tukea osa-aikatyölle, joka tehdään uran eh-
toopuolella. Vuonna 1998 osa-aikaeläkkeen alaikärajaa laskettiin kahdella vuo-
della 56:een, mutta ikäraja palautettiin aiemmalla tasolleen viisi vuotta 
myöhemmin. Yksilöllinen varhaiseläke tarjosi pitkään mahdollisuuden työkyvyt-
tömyysperusteiselle eläkkeelle varsinaista työkyvyttömyyseläkettä löyhemmin 
lääketieteellisin kriteerein. Vuonna 2004 yksilöllinen varhaiseläke lakkautettiin. 
Yhteistä näille uudistuksille on ollut se, että tiukentuneita sääntöjä on sovellettu 
vain tietyn vuoden jälkeen syntyneisiin ihmisiin. Koska eri uudistukset vaikutti-
vat eri syntymäkohortteihin, eri vuosina syntyneet ovat tulleet eri varhaiseläke-
                                              
1 Tästä tavoitteesta Vanhasen hallitus ja keskeiset työmarkkinajärjestöt pääsivät yhteisymmärrykseen 
maaliskuussa 2009. Myöhemmissä dokumenteissa tyypillisesti viitataan tarpeeseen nostaa keskimääräistä 
eläkkeellesiirtymisikään "riittävästi". 
  
 
reittien piiriin eri ikäisinä. Vertailemalla eri aikoina syntyneiden henkilöiden siir-
tymiä työmarkkinoilla voidaan arvioida varhaiseläkereittien vaikutuksia työuriin. 
Tutkimus perustuu vuodet 1990–2004 kattavaan rekisteripohjaiseen aineistoon. 
Aineiston avulla seurataan vuosina 1941–48 syntyneitä henkilöitä, jotka olivat 
51-vuotiaina tukevasti työelämässä. Tilastollisen mallin avulla lasketaan toden-
näköisyydet, jolla työllinen henkilö siirtyy tietyssä iässä työttömäksi, työkyvyt-
tömyyseläkkeelle (ml. yksilöllinen varhaiseläke) tai työvoiman ulkopuolelle 
jostain muusta syystä (yleensä vanhuuseläkkeelle). Osa-aikaeläkeläiset lasketaan 
työllisiksi. Mallin avulla arvioidaan, miten nämä todennäköisyydet riippuvat sii-
tä, olisiko henkilö ikänsä puolesta ollut oikeutettu työttömyysturvan lisäpäiviin 
(eli työttömyyseläkeputkeen), yksilölliseen varhaiseläkkeeseen tai osa-aika-
eläkkeeseen. Varhaiseläkereittien vaikutukset voidaan erotella ikä- ja vuosivaiku-
tuksista, koska reformien seurauksena eri vuosina syntyneet henkilöt tulivat eri 
ikäisinä eri varhaiseläkereittien piiriin.   
Lisäksi tilastollisen mallin pohjalta lasketaan, miten työuran odotettu pituus ja 
todennäköisyydet poistua työelämästä eri reittejä pitkin ovat muuttuneet reformi-
en myötä, kun muiden tekijöiden vaikutus eliminoidaan. Nämä laskelmat tehdään 
1947 ja 1948 syntyneille, joita kaikki kolme uudistusta (työttömyysputken ja osa-
aikaeläkkeen ikärajojen nostot sekä yksilöllisen varhaiseläkkeen poisto) koskivat. 
Tulosten mukaan nämä kolme uudistusta ovat yhteensä pidentäneet työuria kes-
kimäärin 3,9 kuukautta. Työurat ovat pidentyneet kaikissa työntekijäryhmissä, 
joskin pidennyksen suuruus vaihtelee ryhmien välillä. Todennäköisyys päätyä 
työkyvyttömyyseläkkeelle 63 vuoden ikään mennessä on laskenut peräti 5,1 pro-
senttiyksikköä. Uudistukset eivät ole juurikaan vähentäneet riskiä poistua työ-
elämästä pitkäaikaistyöttömyyden kautta, mutta uudistusten jälkeen työttömäksi 
on siirrytty työuran myöhemmässä vaiheessa. Siksi ikääntyneiden työttömyys-
jaksot ovat lyhentyneet, vaikka korkea työttömyys on jäänyt vanhimpien ikä-
luokkien ongelmaksi.  
Tarkastelluista reformeista yksilöllisen varhaiseläkkeen poistamisella on ollut 
suurin merkitys. Keskimäärin se on pidentänyt työuria 3,4 kuukaudella, mutta 
vaikutuksen suuruus vaihtelee voimakkaasti eri työntekijäryhmien kesken. 
Kymmenesosalle henkilöistä vaikutus työurien odotettuun pituuteen oli puoli 
vuotta tai enemmän. Tämä joukko koostui kokonaan julkisen sektorin naisista. 
Sen sijaan moniin korkeasti koulutettuihin yksityisen sektorin miehiin uudistus ei 
juurikaan purrut. Työttömyyseläkeputken ikärajan nosto on pidentänyt työuria 
keskimäärin 1,3 kuukaudella. Tämä uudistus vaikutti erityisesti vähän koulutet-
tuihin työntekijöihin tehdasteollisuudessa. Toisin kuin kaksi muuta uudistusta, 
osa-aikaeläkkeen alaikärajan nosto on aavistuksen lyhentänyt työurien keskimää-
räistä pituutta. Tästä huolimatta uudistus lienee kuitenkin lisännyt työllisyyttä 
työtunnein mitattuna, koska uudistuksen myötä osa-aikatyö 56–57-vuotiaiden 
  
 
keskuudessa on vähentynyt. Tutkimusaineisto ei sisällä tietoja työtunneista, joten 
vaikutusta työtunteihin ei voitu arvioida. 
Tutkimustulosten perusteella voidaan tehdä seuraavat johtopäätökset. Ensinnäkin 
työkyvyttömyyseläkkeiden myöntöperusteet ovat syytä olla riittävät tiukat. Jos 
ammatillisia tekijöitä painotetaan voimakkaasti lääketieteellisten kriteerien kus-
tannuksella, työkyvyttömyysperusteisille etuuksille valuu runsaasti ihmisiä, jotka 
voisivat terveytensä puolesta vielä jatkaa työssä. Toiseksi työttömyysputken eh-
tojen lisäkiristyksillä voidaan parantaa ikääntyneiden työllisyyttä tietyissä ryh-
missä, kuten tehdasteollisuuden vähän koulutettujen työntekijöiden keskuudessa. 
Kolmanneksi osa-aikaeläkkeen pelisääntöjä olisi syytä tarkastella kriittisesti. 
Osa-aikaeläke tarjoaa tuntuvan rahallisen kannustimien vähentää työaikaa ilman 
sanottavaa vaikutusta työurien pituuteen. Osa-aikaeläke luultavasti vähentää 
ikääntyneiden työvoiman tarjontaa, vaikka sen alkuperäinen tarkoitus on päinvas-
tainen. Tähän päätelmään on kuitenkin syytä suhtautua pienellä varauksella, kos-
ka tutkimuksessa arvioitiin, miten oikeus hakea osa-aikaeläkettä (ei sitä, miten 
osa-aikaeläkkeen nostaminen) vaikuttaa työssä pysymiseen. 
Tutkimuksessa tarkasteltujen uudistusten jälkeen on työttömyyseläkeputkeen ja 
osa-aikaeläkkeelle pääsyä edelleen rajoitettu. Uudet kiristykset koskevat 1950-
luvulla ja myöhemmin syntyneitä. Työttömyyseläkeputken ikärajaa on nostettu 
kahdella vuodella 1950–54 syntyneille (v. 2005) ja edelleen yhdellä lisävuodella 
sitä myöhemmin syntyneille (v. 2009). Osa-aikaeläkkeen ikäraja on puolestaan 
noussut kahdella vuodella 1952 jälkeen syntyneille (v. 2009). Myös näiden muu-
tosten vaikutuksia työurien pituuteen pyrittiin arvioimaan laskemalla, miten vuo-
sina 1947 ja 1948 syntyneiden työurien odotetut pituudet olisivat muuttuneet, jos 
myös nämä tulevat kiristykset olisivat heitä koskeneet. Tämän harjoituksen pe-
rusteella työttömyysputken lisäkiristykset pidentäisivät työuria keskimäärin 2,5 
kuukaudella. Osa-aikaeläkkeelle pääsyn myöhentäminen puolestaan lyhentäisi 
työuria keskimäärin vajaalla kuukaudella (mutta vähentäisi osa-aikatyön osuutta 
58–59-vuotiaden työntekijöiden keskuudessa). 
Yllä mainitut reformit ovat tuntuvasti kiristäneet varhaiseläkereittien ehtoja. Ne 
kaikki yhdessä (eli ym. vuosien 1997–2009 muutokset) ovat pidentäneet työuria 
noin puolella vuodella, minkä lisäksi osa-aikaeläkkeelle pääsyn rajoittaminen 
lienee lisännyt tehtyjä työtunteja työurien loppupäässä. Näiden lukujen valossa 
hallituksen tavoittelema vähintään kolmen vuoden eläkeiän nousu 2025 mennes-
sä näyttääkin varsin haastavalta tavoitteelta. On myös syytä painottaa, että tutkit-
tujen uudistusten vaikutukset näkyvät jo osittain siinä eläkkeelle siirtymisiän 
lähtötasossa (eli v. 2008 tasossa), johon vähintään kolmen vuoden nousua vielä 
tavoitellaan. 
Lopuksi on syytä todeta, tutkimuksen laskelmissa ei ole juurikaan huomioitu 
vuoden 2005 isoa eläkeuudistusta, jonka vaikutuksista ei vielä ole perusteellista, 
yksilötason empiirisiä arvioita. Aikaisemmat numeeriseen elinaikamalliin nojau-
  
 
tuvat ennusteet kuitenkin viittaisivat siihen, että vuoden 2005 uudistuksen koko-
naisvaikutus työstä poistumisikään olisi reilut puoli vuotta ja eläkkeelle jää-
misikään pari kuukautta enemmän (Hakola & Määttänen, 2007). Ennustetut 
vaikutukset aiheutuisivat lähinnä työttömyyseläkeputken alaikärajan kahden 
vuoden nostosta, jonka vaikutus on jo mukana yllä mainituissa luvuissa, sekä 
vanhuuseläkkeen ikärajojen muutoksista. Hallituksen tavoittelemaan eläkeiän 
nousuun on siis pitkä matka vielä vuoden 2005 uudistusten jälkeenkin. Tosin 
nuorempien sukupolvien parempi terveys ja kevyemmät työt saattavat hoitaa 
osan tavoitteesta.  
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1 Introduction
A tendency for older workers to retire several years before the general retirement age is a common
problem in Europe. In Finland a majority of older people withdraw from employment through
various early retirement schemes. As a result, the e¤ective retirement age is below 60, over ve
years less than the general retirement age. Most early leavers draw either disability pension or
unemployment-related benets, which are typically collected until the age when entitlement to
an old-age pension begins. A disability pension is generally payable to all people whose working
capacity has decreased substantially, but earlier cohorts had been able to qualify for disability
pension benets under less strict medical criteria. A high incidence of long-term unemployment
among older people can be attributed to a combination of extended entitlement to unemployment
benets for workers above a given age threshold and an unemployment pension payable to the
older long-term unemployed. Moreover, gradual withdrawal from employment is possible through
part-time pensions, which can be awarded to workers above a certain age threshold who switch
from full-time to part-time work.
The widespread use of early retirement schemes has raised concerns about the nancial sus-
tainability of the pension system. This is because the old-age dependency ratio the ratio of the
population aged 65 and over to the population aged 15-64 is expected to rise from the current
level of 26% to 45% by 2030 (Statistics Finland, 2009), when Finland will have one of the highest
dependency ratios among the OECD countries. There is consensus among labour unions, employers
and political parties that people must be induced to work longer in order to cope with the nancial
pressure resulting from an ageing society. The overall long-term goal is to postpone the e¤ective
retirement age by at least three years from the present level by 2025. A number of policy reforms
have already been implemented, but additional reforms are called for, even though the e¤ectiveness
of alternative policy measures is open to dispute. The aim of this study is to provide some guidance
for retirement policy by quantifying the e¤ects of past policy changes.
The study provides a comprehensive evaluation of the e¤ects of a series of reforms that altered
the eligibility age thresholds of two early retirement schemes and tightened the medical criteria for
disability pension benets. The rst reform took place in 1997 when the age threshold for extended
unemployment benets was raised by two years. The following year the age threshold for part-time
pensions was reduced by two years, but it was subsequently increased back to its original level ve
years later. In 2003 the opportunity to qualify for disability pension benets under more lenient
medical criteria was abolished. A common feature of these reforms is that the new rules were
applied only to people born after a given year. Since di¤erent cohorts were a¤ected by the various
reforms, a series of the Finnish reforms provides an exceptionally rich quasi-experimental setting
to identity the causal e¤ects of various early retirement options and policy reforms.
In most existing studies of early retirement and disability benets, there has been no exogeneous
variation in eligibility criteria or benet levels to permit credible identication of causal e¤ects (e.g.
Kerkhofs et al., 1999, and Hernæs et al. 2000) or identication hinges solely on functional forms
imposed by some theoretical model (e.g. Heyma, 2004). Some papers exploit variation across
countries (e.g. Börsch-Supan, 2007) or across rms (e.g. Bratberg et al., 2004). A drawback of
these approaches is that the countries and rms also di¤er in many other respects than available
retirement schemes, making causal inference di¢ cult. Krueger and Pischke (1992), Gruber (2000),
Autor and Duggan (2003), and Campolieti (2004) do exploit law changes for identication, but the
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focus of these studies is on the impact of benet levels. In particular, they do not examine the role
of the age thresholds that determine eligibility to apply for a given type of benets, which is the
focal point of the present analysis. Overall, only a few papers analyse similar benet schemes for
older employees by taking advantage of policy changes to identify the causal e¤ects in a credible
way. These include Karström et al. (2008) and Staubli (2009), who consider the e¤ects of the
stringency of medical criteria for disability benet eligibility in Sweden and Austria, respectively,
and Winter-Ebmer (2003), who analyses the impact of unemployment benet duration on layo¤s
of older workers in Austria. Their work is complemented and extended by the present study.
The empirical analysis is based on a large sample drawn from a database produced by Statistics
Finland, which comprises longitudinal information on the entire Finnish population from over
20 administrative registers. A mixed logit model is applied to estimate transition rates out of
work into unemployment, disability retirement and non-participation. The parameters of interest
capture the e¤ects of being eligible to apply for a part-time pension, a disability pension under
more lenient medical criteria, and extended unemployment benets in the event of job loss. These
eligibility e¤ects are identied by exploiting the exogeneous variation in the eligibility rules caused
by the policy reforms. While otherwise informative, the logit coe¢ cients capturing the eligibility
e¤ects are di¢ cult to interpret in terms of quantities of interest from the policy point of view. In
particular, it is not easy to say whether a given policy change has been economically important
or not. Therefore, the logit estimates are also used to evaluate the expected ages at which people
leave employment and destination-specic exit probabilities under di¤erent counterfactual policy
regimes. By comparing these measures between the counterfactual regimes, it is possible to quantify
the mean e¤ects of di¤erent policy reforms, as well as to detect the worker groups that were most
a¤ected by a given reform.
The logit results show that the availability of each benet scheme signicantly a¤ects transition
rates out of work. There is evidence of notable spillover e¤ects, as well as of heterogeneity in
the eligibility e¤ects. According to the counterfactual analysis, the three policy reforms together
have raised the average age at which older people leave employment by 3.9 months. Much of
this increase is attributed to a decline in the incidence of disability retirement, caused by the
abolition of more lenient medical criteria for disability pension eligibility. The increase in the age
threshold for extended unemployment benets has also played an important role, postponing the
average exit age by 1.3 months. It is noteworthy that di¤erent subgroups have been a¤ected by
di¤erent reforms. Tightening disability criteria has a¤ected educated women in the public sector
in particular, postponing their exit from employment by some six months, whereas men in the
manufacturing sector with low education were a¤ected by the reform of the unemployment-related
scheme.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the retirement schemes and the changes
to them over time are discussed. The section also reviews some previous studies and discusses
the likely e¤ects of the reforms under investigation. Section 3 takes a brief look at aggregate
labour market outcomes before and after the reforms. Section 4 describes the data and reports
some descriptive statistics for the sample used. Section 5 contains a discussion of the econometric
approach. Section 6 reports the logit estimates. Section 7 contains a counterfactual analysis of
di¤erent policy reforms. The nal section concludes.
2
2 Institutional framework and previous evidence
In Finland, pension benets consist of two components. The rst is a statutory employment
pension. It accrues separately from each employment relationship and hence its benet level is
determined by the length of employment history and the amount of past earnings. The employment
pension scheme is administrated by various pension institutions and includes several public and
private-sector pension schemes. The second component is a at-rate national pension, which is
provided by the Social Insurance Institution. The national pension is paid in proportion to the
employment pension benet. As a consequence, it is only granted to individuals whose employment
pension is su¢ ciently low because of poor earnings history. Together the employment and national
pension schemes guarantee a pension benet that is no less than a full national pension. Before the
general retirement age, a pension can be granted in form of an early old-age, disability, part-time or
unemployment pension, provided that the required eligibility conditions are met.1 These benets
can be received up to the age when entitlement to an ordinary old-age pension begins.
The eligibility criteria for the early retirement schemes have changed several times during the
period covered by our data. Because of these changes, individuals born in di¤erent years have
become eligible to apply for di¤erent types of benets at di¤erent ages. Figure 1 shows the avail-
ability of di¤erent early exit pathways as a function of age/time for workers born between 1941
and 1948. In the subsequent analysis, the labour market outcomes of these cohorts are modelled
and variation in the eligibility rules is exploited for identication. Before that, the features of the
pension system and the changes in the eligibility rules from the early 1990s to 2004 are discussed
in detail.
2.1 Old-age pension
An ordinary old-age pension is payable to people who have attained the general retirement age
of 65. A lower general retirement age exists in some public-sector employment contracts and in
certain professions. Moreover, people can claim their old-age pension in the form of an early old-age
pension before the general retirement age. This option becomes available at age 60 for private-sector
employees and at age 58 for public-sector employees (this is not shown in gure 1). Alternatively,
one may postpone the receipt of old-age pension benet beyond the general retirement age. If
an old-age pension is claimed early (postponed), the benet level will be permanently reduced
(increased).
The old-age pension system did not change during the period under investigation, but the
reforms of other schemes may have had spillover e¤ects on transitions to early old-age pension
benets. Kerkhofs et al. (1999) and Bratberg et al. (2004) nd that eligibility for an early
retirement scheme lowers transition rates to other benet schemes (such as disability, sickness or
unemployment benets) in the Netherlands and Norway, respectively.2 Their ndings imply that
1A part-time pension can be received only under the employment pension scheme. There are also some pension
benets that are paid under the special acts for farmers, widows/widowers, and war veterans.
2 In the Dutch data analysed by Kerkhofs et al. (1999) the early retirement schemes vary across employers, and
eligibility depends on age and job tenure. An obvious endogeneity problem arises due to the correlation between
job tenure and labour market attachment. In the case of Norway, workers eligibility status is determined by age
and the employers choice to participate in the early retirement scheme. Hence the identication of causal e¤ects in
Bratberg et al. (2004) hinges on the assumption that there are no unobserved characteristics a¤ecting retirement
behaviour between workers in participating and non-participating rms. The assumption is valid if workers do not
3
Figure 1: Eligibility for early exit pathways by year of birth
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1941 51 52 53 *54* *55* 56 57 *58* 59 60 61 62 63
1942 51 52 *53* *54* 55 56 *57* 58 59 60 61 62
1943 51 52 *53* 54 55 *56* 57 58 59 60 61
1944 51 52 53 54 *55* 56 57 58 59 60
1945 *Anticipation* 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59
1946 Unemployment tunnel 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
1947 Part-time pension 51 52 53 54 55 56 57
1948 Individual early retirement 51 52 53 54 55 56
the reforms that tightened the eligibility rules for the unemployment and disability schemes in
Finland may have encouraged some workers to take up early old-age pensions. By exploiting the
di¤erent age thresholds for public and private-sector employees, it is also possible to estimate the
e¤ect of the early old-age pension option on transitions out of work, but a causal interpretation of
such an e¤ect remains questionable due to the potential selection problem.
2.2 Disability pensions
An ordinary disability (OD) pension is payable to individuals aged 16 to 64 whose working capacity
has decreased by at least 60% (by 40% for a partial pension). When determining eligibility, the
individuals ability to support herself based on regular work, age, education, occupation, and place
of residence are taken into account along with the medical assessment. An OD pension can be
granted either indenitely (if return to work is not likely) or for a specic period.
The individual early retirement (IER) pension is another disability pension which is available
for workers who have a long working career and who are unable to continue in their current job
because of impaired health. Compared with the OD pension, eligibility for the IER pension is
subject to more lenient medical criteria. The minimum degree of working incapacity is not dened,
and other factors, like length of employment and working conditions, carry greater weight. But,
unlike the OD pension, the IER pension is payable only to workers above a certain age threshold.
The age threshold was 58 until 2000, when it was raised to 60, and it was subsequently abolished
entirely in 2004. These changes were only applied to people born after 1943 who were unable to
qualify for an IER pension, whereas the earlier cohorts maintained their eligibility (see gure 1).
Essentially, the OD and IER pension schemes provide otherwise similar pathways to disability
benets except that the medical criteria for eligibility are less strict for the latter scheme. It fol-
lows that abolition of the IER pension e¤ectively made the medical criteria for disability pension
eligibility stricter for those born after 1943. In what follows, OD and IER pensions are viewed
as alternative routes to a general disability pension, with workers unable to qualify for disability
benets under the IER scheme simply subject to the stricter medical criteria.
Several authors have stressed the importance of the strictness of eligibility criteria for disability
benets. Cross-country analysis by Börsch-Supan (2007) suggests that as much as three quarters
of the di¤erences in the disability enrolment rates of older people across 13 European countries and
the US can be explained by institutional variables describing the generosity and the ease of access
select their employers on the basis of the pension scheme. It also rules out strategic behaviour by rms at the time
of the participation decision.
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of disability insurance. Autor and Duggan (2003) argue that a dramatic expansion of disability
insurance enrolment over the past two decades in the US cannot be explained by a true increase in
the incidence of disabling illness, but liberalization of the disability benet system has played an
important role.3 The ndings of Gruber (2000) and Campolieti (2004) from Canada suggest that
disability benets distort working decisions unless the eligibility criteria and screening process for
such benets are tough enough.
Studies by Karström et al. (2008) and Staubli (2009) come closest to the present analysis.
They both analyse disability benet reforms closely resembling the abolition of the IER scheme in
Finland. In 1997 the special rules in Sweden for people aged 60-64 that allowed them to qualify
for disability benets under more lenient medical requirements compared with younger groups
were abolished. Karström et al. (2008) nd that the reform led to increases in take-up rates of
unemployment and sick pay insurance rather than in the employment rate in the a¤ected age group.
It is worth noting that these results may be confounded by anticipatory e¤ects. This is because
the reform was announced two years before it came into e¤ect, allowing those who fullled the
pre-reform eligibility criteria, but not the post-reform criteria, to claim disability benets before
the reform. Karström et al. (2008) also provide some evidence of such anticipatory behaviour.
That may have led to compositional changes in the treatment group before and after the reform,
potentially confounding their treatment-control comparisons.
Staubli (2009) considers the e¤ects of the two-year increase in the age threshold for relaxed
eligibility criteria for disability benets in Austria. The age threshold determines whether incapacity
to work is dened in comparison to working in any "reasonable" occupation requiring comparable
education (when below the threshold) or in comparison to working in an occupation similar to the
current one (when above the threshold). Following the increase in the age threshold from 55 to 57
in 1996, the disability enrolment rate of the groups a¤ected by the reform decreased notably. This
decline was accompanied by increases in the take-up rates of unemployment and sickness benets
and, as a consequence, the improvement in employment was rather minor. These e¤ects were
mainly driven by changes in transitions between unemployment, sick leave and disability, whereas
the transition rates from work to unemployment and to sick leave did not change notably.
In the light of the evidence discussed above, the availability of the IER scheme can be expected
to have a strong e¤ect on disability retirement entries, as well as potentially important spillover
e¤ects toward other exit destinations. A related paper by Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (in press), which
analyses the determinants of disability risk in Finland, gives support for the rst hypothesis. Among
other things, their study nds that eligibility for the IER scheme increases the odds of being granted
a disability pension a year by some two thirds. However, they do not allow for heterogeneity in
the e¤ect of IER eligibility. Nor do they consider possible spillover e¤ects on transitions to other
destinations than disability retirement. By exploring impact heterogeneity and spillover e¤ects, this
paper extends and complements the previous analysis. In addition, the present study quanties
the impact of the IER reform on the age of exit from employment, which is the e¤ect of primary
interest from the policy point of view.
3Their state-level analysis does not separately identify the e¤ect of the reduced screening stringency, the topic of
the present paper, from the e¤ect of the increased replacement rates of disability benets.
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2.3 Unemployment tunnel scheme
The unemployment pension is payable to people aged 60-64 who have been unemployed for at least
two years. While the ordinary period of entitlement to unemployment benets is two years, workers
above a certain age threshold at the time of entry into unemployment can collect unemployment
benets until they turn 60 and thus become eligible for the unemployment pension benet. The
combination of extended unemployment benets and the unemployment pension is known as the
unemployment tunnel(UT) scheme. In 1997 the age threshold for extended entitlement to un-
employment benets was raised by two years from 53 to 55. This reform was passed as a law by
parliament in September 1996, and came into force on January 1, 1997. However, according to the
safeguard clause, the former age threshold was applied to workers born before 1944 who either had
resigned from their job or were made redundant before June 1996 and were unemployed on January
1, 1997 (or had received unemployment benets for at least 100 days in 1996). As a consequence
of the reform, workers aged 53 or 54 at the beginning of their unemployment spell who resigned or
were made redundant in June 1996 or later lost their eligibility to the extended benet period.
It is well known that the UT scheme induces employers to target dismissals at those employees
who can qualify for the extended benets and that most people on extended benets do not return
to employment but remain unemployed until retirement. Rantala (2002) and Kyyrä and Wilke
(2007) show that the layo¤ risk of private-sector employees at least doubles at the age threshold
of the UT scheme. Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) estimate that roughly one-half of unemployed
individuals entitled to extended benets withdraw from job search altogether, and passively wait
for early retirement. Moreover, of those who remain active, only a small fraction eventually return
to employment due to demand constraints and poor economic incentives. Thus the UT scheme
e¤ectively serves as a particular pathway to early retirement.
Furthermore, these previous studies also show that the 1997 reform reduced the layo¤ rate and
increased the exit rate from unemployment to employment among workers aged 53 to 54 who lost
their eligibility for the extended benets. Moreover, in anticipation of the forthcoming increase in
the age threshold, a large number of people born before 1944 entered unemployment at the end of
1996 to gain from the old rules (Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007), which must be taken into account in the
analysis. The present paper goes beyond the scope of the previous analysis of the UT scheme by also
considering possible spillover e¤ects on the incidence of disability retirement and non-participation.
It is worth emphasizing that the UT scheme in Finland is not an anomaly, but extended benet
periods are widely available for the older unemployed in many European countries. Although there
is ample evidence that extended benet periods lower re-employment rates and are often used to
bridge the time until retirement (see Hunt, 1995, for Germany, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004, and
Lalive, 2008, for Austria, and Tatsiramos, 2010, for a comparison of Germany, Italy, Spain, and
the UK), very little is known about their e¤ects on transitions out of employment, which is the
topic of the present paper. One exception is Winter-Ebmers (2003) analysis of the extension of
maximum unemployment benet duration from 52 to 209 weeks for workers above age 50 in Austria.
According to his results, the reform led to an increase of 4 to 11 percentage points in the annual
unemployment inow rate. Like the previous studies of the UT scheme in Finland, Winter-Ebmer
(2003) does not consider other exit destinations than unemployment.
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2.4 Part-time pension
Gradual withdrawal from the labour market is possible through part-time pensions, which can
be awarded to workers above a certain age threshold but less than 65 years of age who change
from full-time to part-time work. This requires both the employer and employee to agree on the
arrangement. The part-time pension benet is half of the di¤erence between full-time and part-
time earnings. Before 2003, the fact of drawing a part-time pension did not a¤ect the level of ones
future old-age pension, as old-age pension rights also accrued from the di¤erence between full-time
and part-time earnings. During the sample period, the age threshold for part-time pensions for the
cohorts included in the analysis changed twice. On July 1, 1998 it was temporarily lowered from 58
to 56. This change was meant to be in force until 2000, but was later postponed. In 2003 the age
threshold was changed back to 58 and the old-age pension following receipt of a part-time pension
was cut slightly for those born after 1946 (see gure 1).
The purpose of the part-time pension scheme is to provide an alternative for ageing full-time
employees with reduced work capacity or work motivation who might otherwise withdraw from
work altogether. In particular, part-time pensions are supposed to reduce the inow to disabil-
ity pensions. It is worth emphasizing that the part-time pension scheme subsidies reductions in
working hours rather generously. This is because the extra costs of part-time pensions are cov-
ered collectively by the whole system, not by part-time pensioners or their employers themselves.
Therefore, in order for the scheme to be economically benecial from societys point of view, taking
up a part-time pension should, on average, postpone full-time retirement considerably.
It is likely that at least some people reduce their working time to gain from the subsidy without
remaining employed any longer. A recent study by Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2006) provides
some support for this concern. Using survey data on the aspirations of workers aged 57-63 regarding
their old-age retirement behaviour, they nd no statistically signicant e¤ects from being on a part-
time pension on personsplanned timing of old-age retirement. On the other hand, their sample
size was very small (382 individuals, of whom 91 were receiving part-time pension benets at the
time of the survey), making the estimates inaccurate.
Even though formal part-time pension schemes are not very common, many countries have
adopted policies that allow partial retirement at older ages. These arrangements vary from country
to country; see Latulippe and Turner (2000) for an overview. In the US labour market, for example,
older workers often leave their career job before the o¢ cial retirement age to take up an early pension
benet. Such a pension benet is then combined with earnings from a new job, which is often a
part-time job. These "bridge" jobs are frequently located outside the industry and occupation of
the career job (e.g. Ruhm, 1990), making them quite di¤erent from the part-time jobs held by
part-time pensioners in Finland.
2.5 Other changes in pension schemes requiring attention
In addition to the reforms discussed above, there are a few other reforms, which are not of interest
but must be taken into account in the analysis. The reason is that these reforms were associated
with safeguard clauses, which triggered anticipatory behaviour just before the law changes came
into force. The rst reform (1996 reform) cut benet levels for various early retirement schemes,
including unemployment pensions. The reduced benet levels apply to workers who started collect-
ing early pension benets in 1996 or later. According to the safeguard clause associated with the
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law change, all those born before 1943 who were unemployed on January 1, 1996 remain covered
by the old rules in case of early retirement (regardless of the day the early retirement event takes
places in the future). Anticipation of the law change caused an excess inow to unemployment at
the end of 1995 among older employees who beneted from the safeguard clause (see Kyyrä and
Wilke, 2007). Another reform (2000 reform) that cut unemployment pension benets took e¤ect
in 2000. This was part of the same reform package that abolished the IER scheme. Once again,
there was the safeguard clause stating that the benet reduction did not apply to individuals born
before 1945 who were unemployed on January 1, 2000 provided they had either resigned from their
job or were made redundant before August 1999. As a consequence, there was an excess inow to
unemployment in 1999 for these cohorts. Although these two reforms are not of interest here, the
anticipatory e¤ects in 1996 and 1999 (see gure 1) resulting from the associated safeguard clauses
must be taken into account in the research design.
Finally, there was a large reform (2005 reform) of the pension system in 2005. It led to changes
in the pension accrual rates and the length of the earnings history accounted for when determining
the level of the pension benet. In addition, the upper bound for the old-age pension benet was
abolished, and a more exible scheme for old-age retirement, allowing individuals to freely choose
their retirement age between 63 and 68, was introduced. Although these changes came into e¤ect
after our observation period, the reform may have induced anticipatory behaviour in 2004. This is
because for those retiring between 2005 and 2011 their pension benets are calculated according
to both the old and new rules, and the higher benet is granted. This suggests that some people
who would have retired in 2004 in the absence of the reform may have postponed their entry into
old-age pension benets, which should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
3 Economic conditions
Before turning to the econometric analysis, it is useful to take a brief look at labour market
outcomes before and after a series of the reforms studied and to discuss changes in the economic
environment. First of all, one should bear in mind that the period under investigation covers very
turbulent economic times. In the early 1990s Finland experienced a severe recession. The economy
contracted three years in a row (1991-1993), leading to a drop of over 10% in GDP and pushing the
unemployment rate above 16%. The recession years were followed by a period of strong economic
growth that lasted until 2008, when the global economic crisis, triggered by the US subprime
mortgage collapse, hit the Finnish economy.
Figure 2 displays the population shares of 40-65-year-old people in di¤erent labour market states
at the end of 1996 and 2004. The earlier year o¤ers a snapshot of the time just before the rst
reform of interest, the two-year increase in the age threshold of extended unemployment benets
in 1997. The latter year represents a time when all the reforms had been in force at least for a
while. As shown in gure 2d, almost all people were drawing old-age pension benets at age 65 in
both years. Only 6-7% of people postponed their entry into old-age retirement beyond the general
retirement age. In 1996 a higher share of people were on old-age pensions at all ages, but the
di¤erence compared with 2004 is noteworthy only at ages 61 and 63. Among those not yet awarded
an old-age pension, there are striking di¤erences in the incidence of employment, unemployment
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Figure 2: Population shares in di¤erent labour market states at the end of 1996 and 2004 by age
(Source: Authors computations from FLEED)
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and disability retirement between the two years.4
The employment rate for people in their 40s is some 5 percentage points higher in 2004 than
in 1996, whereas the di¤erence in the unemployment rates is of the same size but in the opposite
direction. This indicates a strong positive employment e¤ect from the improved economic envi-
ronment in 2004. Among older groups, employment improved still more; the employment rates of
people in their late 50s and early 60s are at least some 10 percentage points higher in 2004. When
part-time pension recipients are also counted as employed, the improvement in the employment
level is even bigger for these groups. In that case, the employment rate in 2004 exceeds the 1996
level by some 15 to 20 percentage points. The employment gains are accompanied by the sharp
drop in disability pension enrolment rates (gure 2c), perhaps resulting from the abolition of the
IER scheme.
4Only salary and wage earners are counted as employed in gure 2, because it is their behaviour that is analysed.
Adding self-employed persons to the numbers would increase employment levels without altering the shape of the
curves.
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Despite the drastic improvement in the economic environment, the incidence of being on
unemployment-related benets among people above 60 years of age increased from 1996 to 2004.
At the end of 2004, one in four of people aged 62 to 64 were granted an unemployment pension
or received unemployment benets (gure 2b). At a glance, these numbers seem puzzling, as one
might have expected to nd lower unemployment rates for the oldest groups in 2004 as a result
of improved economic conditions and the reforms of the UT scheme that tightened the eligibility
criteria and cut benet levels. One should also notice that the reformed disability pension scheme
does not play a role here: the abolition of the IER scheme a¤ected the cohorts that were 60 years of
age or less at the end of 2004 (see gure 1). That is, the stricter eligibility criteria for disability pen-
sion benets cannot explain the large shift from disability benets towards unemployment-related
benets in the oldest group. The astonishing levels of unemployment-related benet recipients
in the oldest groups in 2004 arise in large part from anticipatory behaviour associated with the
implementation of the UT scheme reforms. As seen in gure 1, people aged 60 or more at the
end of 2004 have been covered by the safeguard clause of at least one reform a¤ecting the UT
scheme. And those born in 1941-43 have been covered by the safeguard clauses of all three reforms
in 1996, 1997 and 2000. Many of these people entered unemployment already in 1995, 1996 or 1999
in anticipation of the following years reform, and ended up collecting unemployment benets for
several years until qualifying for an unemployment pension at age 60.
To summarize, the employment rates of people in their late 50s and early 60s increased sub-
stantially from the mid-1990s to 2004. While the ourishing economic environment following the
recession years of the early 1990s explains part of the improvement, it is not the whole story. The
drastic decline in disability enrolment rates together with the increasing number of the oldest peo-
ple on unemployment pension benets point to an important role for the pension reforms. In what
follows, the paper aims at separating the causal e¤ects of distinct policy changes from the business
cycle e¤ects, while making a distinction between the anticipatory and permanent policy e¤ects.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The data for this study come from the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Database (FLEED)
maintained by Statistics Finland. The worker records in the FLEED are obtained by merging in-
formation from over 20 administrative registers through the use of unique personality identity
numbers. This database e¤ectively covers all people permanently resident in Finland, and its infor-
mation content is extensive. Along with variables on socio-demographic background, the database
includes detailed information on annual income (from the tax authorities), employment (from the
pension institutes), unemployment and participation in labour market programmes (from the em-
ployment o¢ ces). There is also information on what kind of pension benets, if any, the person
received at the end of each year (from the pension institutions). With this source of data it is
possible to follow the entire Finnish population over time and across di¤erent labour market states.
The focus of this study is on people born between 1941 and 1948 who worked for local or central
government, or held a private-sector job covered by the EmployeesPension Act (TEL) at the end
of the year when they were 51 years old (see gure 1).5 A further requirement is that the worker
5These sample restrictions leave out self-employed persons and those working for the Church, Bank of Finland,
the Social Insurance Institution of Finland or the Åland Parliament, as well as a few small private-sector employee
groups who are covered by the Temporary EmployeesPension Act (LEL) or by the Pension Act for Performing
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was employed at least for the past two years, had worked for the current employer for at least one
year, had annual earnings of no less than e6000 and did not receive any pension benets in the
year when he turned 51. The resulting sample obviously represents people who had a strong labour
market attachment in their 50s, which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. The
individuals are observed over a period from 1990 to 2004.
To reduce computational burden, a one-tenth random sample of the underlying population is
used in the estimations. These workers are followed until the end of the observation period or until
they leave employment for one of the competing reasons: unemployment, disability retirement
or non-participation. The labour market states are observed at the end of each year. Part-time
pensioners are classied as employed. Non-participation includes all other states outside the labour
force except being on a disability pension. Although some workers died or emigrated, the most
common reason for leaving the labour force without a disability pension at older ages is being
awarded an (early) old-age pension benet. For example, among workers aged 58 and above, 84%
of exits to non-participation are due to receipt of an old-age pension benet. In most cases, the
transition out of employment is an absorbing event, which is not surprising given the age structure of
the sample. However, a small fraction of workers (3.5%) exited from employment but then returned
to employment during the observation period. For these individuals, more than one employment
episode is recorded and used in the analysis. Overall, the sample contains 131,162 year-specic
observations on 19,674 individuals.
Table 1 reports the sample means of some background variables for all the workers (column
1) and subgroups leaving employment through di¤erent exit pathways (columns 2 to 4). The last
column reports the sample means for those whose exit destination is not observed, as they were
still employed at the end of 2004. The time-varying variables are measured at the rst year of the
observation period, when the worker was 51 years old. From the last row of the table one can see
that over half of the individuals did not leave employment by the end of the observation period.
Such a high rate of censoring is not surprising given that the youngest cohorts in the data were less
than 60 years old at the end of 2004. The most popular exit destination is unemployment, whereas
exits to disability pension and non-participation are almost equally common.
There are basically no di¤erences in exit pathways between women and men, nor between
married and non-married people. Entries to disability pension may be slightly more common in
Eastern Finland than in other parts of the country, whereas workers living in Uusimaa are less
likely to end up unemployed. Public-sector employees are much less likely to be laid o¤ (or quit for
unemployment), but more likely to be granted a disability pension or move to non-participation
compared with other workers. By contrast, manufacturing workers have the highest risk of becoming
unemployed and a relatively low risk of leaving work for non-participation. Compared with those
entering unemployment or becoming disabled, workers who remained employed until the end of the
observation period or left work for non-participation are, on average, somewhat better educated,
have higher earnings and higher taxable wealth.
Empirical transition rates to the three competing destinations are depicted in gure 3.6 Exits
to non-participation are very rare up to age 56, but then there is an increase in the transition rate
Artists and Certain Groups of Employees (TaEL).
6The transition rate for exit destination j at age a is dened as the fraction of people employed at the end of the
year when they were a years old who occupied state j by the end of the next year. It follows that at the time of the
transiton the worker can either be a or a+ 1 years old.
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Table 1: Mean characteristics at age 51 by exit destination
Exit destination:
All Unempl. Disability Non-part. Censored
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0:537 0:512 0:549 0:521 0:546
Married 0:747 0:725 0:739 0:764 0:751
Own house 0:846 0:848 0:841 0:859 0:844
Area of residence:
Uusimaa 0:326 0:255 0:282 0:380 0:345
Southern Finland 0:372 0:448 0:370 0:344 0:355
Eastern Finland 0:103 0:107 0:132 0:095 0:098
Central Finland 0:117 0:110 0:121 0:098 0:122
Northern Finland 0:081 0:079 0:094 0:083 0:079
Tenure < 2 years 0:057 0:064 0:046 0:054 0:057
Sector:
Public sector 0:386 0:132 0:449 0:521 0:423
Manufacturing 0:256 0:438 0:253 0:155 0:222
Trade 0:123 0:174 0:100 0:096 0:118
Transportation 0:054 0:075 0:063 0:042 0:049
Services 0:090 0:111 0:059 0:094 0:089
Other 0:090 0:070 0:076 0:091 0:099
Unemployment rate 0:201 0:213 0:211 0:207 0:194
Years of education 11:290 10:480 10:720 11:636 11:576
Earnings, e/year 29; 261 26; 450 26; 119 32; 363 30; 081
Taxable wealth, e/year 19; 792 17; 659 17; 755 20; 968 20; 598
# of individuals 19; 674 3493 2259 2408 11; 514
Notes: Mean values are computed at the age of 51. Workers with more than one employment spells are classied
according to the exit destination of the last spell. Censored observations include those who were employed at the
end of 2004. Southern Finland also includes Åland.
at age 57. This is because public-sector employees can access to an early old-age pension during the
next year when they turn 58. The much larger group of private-sector employees become eligible
for an early old-age pension two years later, which explains the sharp peak in the transition rate to
non-participation at age 59. Not surprisingly, a transition to non-participation is by far the most
likely outcome for workers who are still employed around age 60.
The transition rate to disability pension increases until age 60, when it starts to decline. 57-
year-old workers born before 1944 attain the age threshold for the IER scheme during the next
year, which probably explains the increasing pattern of the disability rate between ages 57 and 60.
The declining pattern of the transition rate thereafter may indicate that the early old-age pension,
which is available for all workers aged 60 or more, provides an alternative exit pathway for those
with reduced working capacity. The transition rate to unemployment doubles at age 54, as most
people can qualify for extended unemployment benets for the rst time during the next year. It
is noteworthy that unemployment is the most common reason for leaving employment until age 58.
While the transition rates in gure 3 illustrate the average exit probabilities at di¤erent ages,
they do not tell much about the importance of the early retirement options. In the pooled data
some of the people employed at a given age can qualify for a certain retirement scheme while others
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Figure 3: Empirical transition rates out of employment
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cannot, depending on the birth year. Secondly, to be at risk of leaving employment at a given age,
one has to remain employed until that age (or to be re-employed if exiting at a younger age). This
dynamic selection process is generally driven by both the observed and unobserved characteristics
of individuals, by the availability of various early retirement options and by anticipatory behaviour
triggered by the safeguard clauses of the UT reforms. To recover the causal e¤ects of being eligible
for various early exit schemes from the various selection e¤ects, a mixed logit model is used for
estimating the transition rates.
5 Econometric model
5.1 Mixed logit model for transition probabilities
Consider a worker i who is a years old and employed at the end of year t. One year later the
worker can either be unemployed (j = U) ; on a disability pension (j = D) ; outside the labour
force for some other reason (j = O) or still employed (j = E) : Let hij (a jvi) be the probability
that the worker leaves work for state j = fU;D;Og by the end of year t + 1: The reference event
is staying employed until the end of the next year (i.e. until age a + 1), the probability of which
is hiE (a jvi) : These probabilities depend on age a, the control variables Xia; the available benet
scheme options Earlyia; IERia; PTPia; and UTia; and the unobserved factors vi = (viU ; viD; viO):7
The age-dependent transition probabilities are assumed to be of the mixed (multinominal) logit
form. Hence, the log odds of entering state j 2 fU;D;Og by age a + 1 (i.e. by the end of year
t+ 1) rather than staying employed for one additional year are given by
ln

hij (a jvi)
hiE (a jvi)

= aj +Xiaj + 'jEarlyia + jIERia + jPTPia + jUTia + vij ; (1)
which implies
hij (a jvi) =
exp
 
aj +Xiaj + 'jEarlyia + jIERia + jPTPia + jUTia + vij

1 +
P
k exp (ak +Xiak + 'kEarlyia + kIERia + kPTPia + kUTia + vik)
: (2)
7Note that, for ease of expression, hiE (a jvi)  hiE (a jXia; Earlyia; IERia; PTPia; UTia;vi) :
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The transition probabilities conditional on being employed at a given age take into account that
the occurrence of one event (e.g. dismissal) removes the individual from the risk of the other events
(e.g. exit from work to a disability pension or to an early old-age pension). This modelling approach
is convenient because it allows us to deal with the competing exit routes, time-varying regressors
(e.g. age and eligibility status for di¤erent retirement schemes) and censored observations (persons
still employed at the end of 2004).
The covariates in Xia include the regional-specic unemployment rate, gender, marital status,
years of education, earnings, a dummy for a short employment relationship, sector dummies, year
xed e¤ects, and dummies for those covered by the safeguard clauses of the UT reforms. The year
xed e¤ects measure the e¤ects of changes in health, economic conditions and attitudes towards
early retirement that a¤ect all workers in the same way. The last set of dummy variables aims to
capture the anticipatory e¤ects triggered by the UT reforms by allowing for temporary increases
in the exit probabilities one year before the reforms in 1996, 1997 and 1999 for those who were
covered by the safeguard clauses. Some variables reported in table 1 are excluded from Xia; as
they would not produce statistically signicant e¤ects if added to the analysis.
The age-specic xed e¤ects (ajs) allow for fully exible age patterns for the transition prob-
abilities. Earlyia; IERia and PTPia are dummy variables for eligibility to apply for  hence a
chance to be granted an early old-age pension, a disability pension under the IER scheme and
a part-time pension during the next year, respectively. UTia is a dummy variable for eligibility for
the extended period of unemployment benets (which is followed by the unemployment pension)
in the event of job loss. The coe¢ cients of these variables are the parameters of primary interest,
capturing the eligibility e¤ects of various early retirement schemes. Since all the eligibility variables
enter all the odds ratios, the spillover e¤ects are explicitly allowed for. For instance, eligibility for
the IER scheme does not only a¤ect the odds of disability retirement (as measured by D) but can
also a¤ect the odds of becoming unemployed (as measured by U ) and that of leaving the labour
force for other reasons (as measured by O).
Despite the full set of age and year xed e¤ects, the e¤ects of IERia; PTPia and UTia are
identied due to variation in the eligibility age thresholds across individuals born in di¤erent years
(see gure 1), caused by a series of the reforms. Since the variation is driven by age and birth
year, these variables are independent of the unobservables, vi, and hence their coe¢ cients can be
given a causal interpretation.8 Although the early old-age pension scheme did not change during
the observation period, the e¤ect of Earlyia can be separately estimated from the age and year
e¤ects by exploiting the di¤erent age thresholds for private and public-sector employees. But, as
workers may not be randomly allocated between the two sectors, the causal interpretation remains
questionable in this case.
Exogeneous variation stemming from the reforms does not eliminate the need to control for
unmeasured di¤erences between individuals, which can arise for a variety of reasons. For example,
people are likely to di¤er in their valuation of leisure time. It is likely that some have permanent
physical or mental defects that a¤ect their possibilities to continue working at older ages. In general,
8This also explains why the model includes the dummy variable for eligibility for the part-time pension scheme,
but not for actual receipt of part-time pension benets. While the dummy for eligibility to apply is an exogenous
covariate, the eligible individuals choice to exploit the part-time pension option is certainly not. To estimate the
causal e¤ect of the receipt of part-time pension benets, one has to deal with the self-selection problem, which would
lead to a much more complicated econometric model. While such an e¤ect is of obvious interest, estimating it is left
for future work.
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workers with lower employability for unobserved reasons leave employment at a higher probability at
each age, and hence the proportion of such persons among those still employed, i.e. at risk of making
a transition, at a given age decreases with age. As a result, the failure to control for unobserved
heterogeneity leads to the downward biased estimates of the transition probabilities at older ages.
This is a serious cause for concern in our case, because the early retirement schemes are not readily
available at age 51, but one has to survive in employment for several years before qualifying for
such schemes. To deal with the selection problem, the model incorporates three heterogeneity
terms: viU ; viD and viO; which are assumed to be normally distributed and potentially mutually
correlated. That is, vi s N(0;
); with
 unrestricted. For example, a worker who is less motivated
or has a defect that makes working di¢ cult may consider all alternatives to escape employment,
which would imply a positive correlation between the unobserved terms. Without imposing a priori
restrictions on 
; such a possibility is explicitly allowed for. Moreover, the model with unobserved
heterogeneity does not impose the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, which has
been regarded as the major weakness of the standard multinominal logit specication.
Note that the parameters of the mixed logit model should be interpreted with some caution. The
coe¢ cients of the covariates have a straightforward interpretation only in terms of the e¤ects on the
odds ratios (conditional on the observed and unobserved characteristics). For example, eU gives the
proportional e¤ect of UT eligibility on the odds of becoming unemployed, hiU (a jvi) =hiE (a jvi) :
But it does not tell how the probability of unemployment entry, hiU (a jvi) ; is a¤ected by the
availability of the UT scheme. In addition to U ; this e¤ect also depends on D and O; and more
generally, on the values of all the conditioning covariates (some of which are not even observed). If
UT eligibility increases the transition rates to all exit destinations, it is possible that the odds of
becoming unemployed increase but the probability of becoming unemployed during the next year
decreases. And this can be the case for some people but not for all, depending on the value of their
background characteristics. Nor there is a single parameter that would tell us how the probability
of remaining employed until a given age (the survival rate) or the probability of eventually leaving
employment for unemployment are a¤ected by a change in the UT scheme. For these reasons,
in addition to reporting the logit coe¢ cients, the e¤ects of the policy reforms are quantied by
computing various probabilities and expected values under di¤erent policy regimes. But before
turning to the results, the parameters of the logit transition rates must be estimated rst.
5.2 Estimation
The likelihood contribution of worker i with Ki employment spells is given by
Li =
Z KiY
k=1
`ik(vi) (vi) dvi; (3)
where `ik(vi) is the likelihood for the k-th employment spell given vi and  is the density of vi: Each
spell is either completed, i.e. ends with a transition to state j = fU;D;Og ; or is right-censored,
i.e. still in progress at the end of the observation period. In the case of a completed spell of
employment lasting from age aik until a transition to state j between ages aik and aik +1 (that is,
the worker was still employed at the end of year when he was aik years old, but occupied state j
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at the end of the next year),
`ik(vi) =
aik 1Y
l=aik
hiE (l jvi)hij (aik jvi) : (4)
For the censored spell
`ik(vi) =
aikY
l=aik
hiE (l jvi) ; (5)
where aik is the workers age at the end of 2003. Recall that ai1 = 51 for all individuals by
construction, and that only 3.5% of individuals have more than one employment spell and hence
have Ki > 1: It follows that the model is essentially a discrete-time competing risks model for
the length of the residual employment career beyond age 51. Inclusion of those few spells that
begin at older ages in the analysis enhances the e¢ ciency and helps to pin down the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity.
The estimation task is complicated by the fact that the integral in (3) does not have a closed-
form expression. To overcome this di¢ culty, worker is likelihood contribution is approximated
with the simulated probability
eLi = 1
R
RX
r=1
KiY
k=1
`ik(v
r
i ); (6)
where vri is the r-th draw from density . The unknown parameters of the model can be obtained
by maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function based on (6). Instead of using pseudo-random
draws, Halton draws (along with a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix) are used
in the simulations in order to reduce the number of draws, R; required to obtain an accurate
approximation; see Train (2009) for a discussion of various simulation methods for mixed logit
models. The results below are based on 500 Halton draws. The standard errors are computed
using the robust sandwichestimator of the covariance matrix, as recommended by McFadden and
Train (2000).
6 Parameter estimates
Here we discuss the estimation results of the two model specications. The rst one imposes the
restriction that the eligibility e¤ects are identical across individuals. The results for this baseline
specication are reported in table 2. To detect impact heterogeneity, a number of extended model
specications containing the interactions of the eligibility dummies and various sets of background
variables were also estimated. Most such interactions do not produce statistically signicant e¤ects
and hence should not be added to the model. Table 3 shows the results for the model specication
that includes only interaction terms with at least one statistically signicant coe¢ cient (5% risk
level). Apart from the interaction terms, this extended model is similar to the one with the
homogeneous eligibility e¤ects in table 2.
To ease the interpretation of the age e¤ects, the models include an intercept for each exit desti-
nation j while 51j is restricted to 0. It follows that eaj describes the odds of leaving employment
for state j for a worker aged a compared to the same worker at the reference age 51. Not surpris-
ingly, a strong age-dependency is found for all the transition rates. In table 2 the odds of becoming
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unemployed become eightfold from age 51 to age 60 (e2:097  8:14), whereas the odds of being
granted a disability pension become tenfold (e2:295  9:92). The odds of leaving the labour force
for some other reason than a disability pension increase even more, with a large discrete change at
age 59. Despite di¤erences in the magnitude of some point estimates, the same conclusions about
age-dependency can drawn from the extended model in table 3. The e¤ects of background char-
acteristics, such as gender, education and employer sector, are relatively similar in both models.
Since these e¤ects are of secondary interest, they are not discussed further here.
To control for anticipatory behaviour before the UT reforms, the models contain year-specic
dummy variables for those covered by the safeguard clauses. These anticipationdummies equal
1 for those born 1941-42 at risk in 1995, for those born 1941-43 at risk in 1996, and for those
born 1941-44 at risk in 1999 (see the cells marked with stars in gure 1). The coe¢ cients of these
variables indicate strong anticipatory behaviour one year before the UT reforms. The estimates in
table 2 suggest that the odds of becoming unemployed increased by 77%, 98% and 51% in 1995,
1996 and 1999, respectively, among those covered by the safeguard clauses. There is no evidence of
signicant anticipation behaviour towards other exit channels. The point estimates in table 3 are
almost identical.
Turning to the eligibility e¤ects, it appears that those who can qualify for an early old-age
pension are much more likely to withdraw from the labour market and less likely to become un-
employed than otherwise similar non-eligible workers. In the baseline model, the odds of non-
participation increase by 154% (e0:931  2:54) and those of entering unemployment decrease by
36% (e 0:440  0:644) at the age threshold of the early old-age pension. The latter e¤ect implies
that sometimes an early old-age pension can provide an alternative for unemployment benets for
those employees who would have lost their job in any case. But this nding is not robust, as
the e¤ect loses its statistical signicance in the extended model with gender-specic e¤ects. The
inclusion of the female interactions reveals that the availability of an early old-age pension induces
women in particular to withdraw from the labour market: the odds of non-participation increase
by 193% for women (e0:402+0:672  2:93), but only by 49% for men (e0:402  1:49). As pointed out
earlier, these estimates should be interpreted with some caution due to the potential endogeneity
issue, as all the variation in early old-age pension eligibility stems from the di¤erent age thresholds
for private and public-sector employees. If there are unmeasured di¤erences between employees in
the two sectors, the estimated e¤ects can be biased. Fortunately, the other eligibility e¤ects are
not subject to the same concern.
In the baseline model, eligibility for the IER scheme increases the odds of being granted a
disability pension by 128% (e 0:823  2:28), but has no e¤ect on the other odds ratios. In the
extended model, this e¤ect is signicantly higher for private-sector employees than for otherwise
similar public servants. In table 2 the e¤ect of IER eligibility on the odds of non-participation does
not di¤er signicantly from zero at the conventional risk levels. But, in the extended specication,
the e¤ect is negative for men in the private sector, albeit statistically signicant only at the 10%
risk level, whereas it is positive for public-sector women. IER eligibility has no e¤ect on the odds
of becoming unemployed.
In the baseline model, the only e¤ect of part-time pension eligibility is a 20% decline in the
odds of becoming unemployed (e0:227  0:80). In the extended model, such an e¤ect is present only
for public-sector employees. In other words, a civil servant who is at risk of becoming unemployed
for example, because of poor motivation or reduced working capacity may be able to keep his
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Table 2: Parameter estimates from the logit model with homogeneous eligibility e¤ects
Unemployment Disability Non-participation
coe¤. ste coe¤. ste coe¤. ste
Intercept  1:799 0:190  6:033 0:505  5:177 0:301
age 52 0:148 0:113 0:711 0:158 0:024 0:143
age 53 0 :218 0:115 1:017 0:169 0:182 0:143
age 54 0:568 0:172 1:409 0:280 0:632 0:287
age 55 1:086 0:199 1:606 0:322 0:834 0:321
age 56 1:071 0:214 1:558 0:348 0:981 0:334
age 57 1:446 0:244 1:430 0:387 1:581 0:369
age 58 1:714 0:260 1:846 0:407 1:526 0:383
age 59 2:232 0:315 2:032 0:448 2:804 0:408
age 60 2:097 0:345 2:305 0:492 2:295 0:440
age 61 2:027 0:382 2:282 0:528 2:616 0:462
age 62 2:692 0:423 2:194 0:586 4:041 0:499
1995 x born 1941-42 0:570 0:274  0:119 0:405 0:394 0:379
1996 x born 1941-43 0:682 0:236 0:372 0:353  0:327 0:317
1999 x born 1941-44 0:411 0:141 0:001 0:170 0:057 0:181
log (unemployment rate) 0:844 0:084 0:439 0:105 0:012 0:086
Female  0:045 0:050  0:168 0:067  0:140 0:066
Married  0:182 0:048  0:085 0:063 0:019 0:055
Years of education  0:081 0:013  0:153 0:019  0:040 0:015
log (earnings)  0:824 0:070  0:487 0:098 0:348 0:108
Tenure < 2 years 0:674 0:058 0 :148 0:090 0:404 0:072
Public sector  2:095 0:076 0:206 0:087 0:379 0:085
Trade  0:290 0:065  0:290 0:107 0:281 0:103
Transportation  0:304 0:084 0:395 0:124 0:453 0:118
Services  0:227 0:075  0:159 0:124 0:568 0:099
Other sector  0:847 0:081 0:049 0:114 0:315 0:102
Early O-A eligibility  0:440 0:139 0:098 0:119 0:931 0:107
IER eligibility 0:074 0:107 0:823 0:141 0:172 0:114
PTP eligibility  0:227 0:101 0:060 0:137  0:167 0:145
UT eligibility 0:850 0:139  0:067 0:204  0:081 0:246
Log-likelihood  37; 866:5
Notes: The model also includes 11 year xed e¤ects. The reference worker is a non-married 51-year-old man who
holds a manufacturing job with the duration of no less than two years. Years of education are measured in
deviation from 11, which corresponds to the secondary level of education. Earnings refer to the average earnings in
years t-1 and t-2; and log earnings is measured in deviation from 10, which corresponds to about 22,000 euros a
year. Standard errors are based on the robust sandwichcovariance matrix. Signicantly non-zero coe¢ cients in
bold (5% risk level) or italics (10% risk level).
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Table 3: Parameter estimates from the logit model with heterogeneous eligibility e¤ects
Unemployment Disability non-participation
coe¤. ste coe¤. ste coe¤. ste
Intercept  1:858 0:195  5:881 0:508  4:901 0:292
age 52 0:185 0:115 0:702 0:156 0:041 0:144
age 53 0:266 0:117 0:998 0:164 0:206 0:145
age 54 0:607 0:174 1:383 0:274 0:658 0:290
age 55 1:124 0:201 1:577 0:314 0:856 0:324
age 56 1:117 0:217 1:525 0:339 1:004 0:338
age 57 1:431 0:247 1:342 0:381 1:692 0:374
age 58 1:706 0:263 1:761 0:400 1:631 0:388
age 59 1:691 0:332 1:871 0:448 3:087 0:415
age 60 1:571 0:359 2:142 0:491 2:605 0:446
age 61 1:488 0:397 2:117 0:524 2:950 0:469
age 62 2:111 0:437 2:033 0:578 4:427 0:504
1995 x born 1941-42 0:593 0:277  0:104 0:400 0:387 0:381
1996 x born 1941-43 0:685 0:237 0:378 0:350  0:328 0:318
1999 x born 1941-44 0:412 0:142 0:007 0:169 0:058 0:183
log (unemployment rate) 0:868 0:086 0:442 0:102  0:039 0:088
Female  0:012 0:054  0 :131 0:072  0:608 0:078
Married  0:195 0:049  0:088 0:061 0:046 0:057
Years of education  0:065 0:016  0:144 0:022 0:079 0:021
log (earnings)  1:435 0:145  0:528 0:177  0:475 0:198
Tenure < 2 years 0:683 0:058 0:139 0:089 0:397 0:073
Public sector  1:894 0:082 0:249 0:094  0:050 0:107
Trade  0:308 0:066  0:287 0:105 0:313 0:103
Transportation  0:309 0:086 0:386 0:121 0:445 0:118
Services  0:231 0:077  0:161 0:121 0:602 0:099
Other sector  0:868 0:084 0:020 0:111 0:391 0:101
Early O-A eligibility 0:251 0:180 0:226 0:161 0:402 0:142
x female  0:220 0:145 0:013 0:156 0:672 0:142
IER eligibility 0:149 0:127 1:028 0:178  0 :277 0:155
x public sector  0:232 0:177  0:347 0:147 0:366 0:131
x female  0:097 0:131  0:108 0:160 0:426 0:149
PTP eligibility  0:147 0:107 0:088 0:152  0:752 0:176
x public sector  0:669 0:141  0:024 0:131 0:702 0:139
x schooling years  0 :037 0:021  0:014 0:028  0:185 0:025
x log (earnings) 0:009 0:117  0:137 0:172 1:290 0:231
UT eligibility 0:792 0:139  0:092 0:204  0:098 0:257
x log (earnings) 0:665 0:153 0:171 0:197 0:062 0:238
Log-likelihood  37; 701:7
Notes: The model also includes 11 year xed e¤ects. The reference worker is a non-married 51-year-old man who
holds a manufacturing job with the duration of no less than two years. Years of education are measured in
deviation from 11, which corresponds to the secondary level of education. Earnings refer to the average earnings in
years t-1 and t-2; and log earnings is measured in deviation from 10, which corresponds to about 22,000 euros a
year. Standard errors are based on the robust sandwichcovariance matrix. Signicantly non-zero coe¢ cients in
bold (5% risk level) or italics (10% risk level).
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job by reducing working time in agreement with the employer. This e¤ect does not matter much in
practice, as the overall risk of unemployment is very low in the public sector. Namely, the odds of
becoming unemployed are 85% lower for a civil servant than for an otherwise similar worker holding
a job in the manufacturing sector (e 1:894  0:150). It is noteworthy that the part-time pension
option does not reduce the odds of being granted a disability pension, which is one motivation for
the entire scheme. On the other hand, it a¤ects the odds of labour market withdrawal for other
reasons. For a private-sector employee with 11 years of education and earning about e22,000 a
year, being eligible to apply for a part-time pension reduces the odds of non-participation by 53%
(e 0:752  0:471), while there is no e¤ect for an otherwise identical worker holding a job in the
public sector. Taken together with the heterogeneous e¤ect on the odds of becoming unemployed,
it appears that the part-time pension serves as a substitute for unemployment in the public sector
and for the early old-age pension in the private sector.
Turning to the last scheme, it is not surprising to nd that the UT scheme has a strong e¤ect
on the odds of becoming unemployed. According to the baseline model, when a worker attains the
age threshold of the extended unemployment benets, his odds of becoming unemployed increase
by as much as 134% (e0:85  2:34). The e¤ect appears to be rather similar for all people, varying
only with earnings in the extended model. A stronger e¤ect for better-paid workers suggests the
possibility that some of those who can qualify for high (earnings-related) unemployment benets
self-select themselves into unemployment. There is no evidence of spillover e¤ects on the odds of
disability or non-participation.
To summarize, the logit estimates indicate that eligibility for each early retirement scheme
has signicant e¤ects on the transition rates out of work. Moreover, there is evidence of notable
spillover e¤ects, as well as of heterogeneity in the eligibility e¤ects, implying that the e¤ects of
di¤erent policy reforms are non-trivial. In the next section the policy reform e¤ects are elaborated
in detail. Before that, a few words about the role of unobserved heterogeneity. First of all, a
signicant degree of unmeasured heterogeneity is found in both specications (these estimates are
not reported here, but are available upon on request). In the extended model, for example, the
estimated variances of the error terms, viU ; viD and viO; are 1.9, 2.6 and 1.6, respectively. The
estimated correlation of viD and viO is 0.3, indicating that people with a high disability risk are
more likely to leave the labour force, not only via disability pension benets, but for other reasons
(i.e. via the early old-age pension) as well. But this correlation is not very strong. The absolute
values of the other two correlations are even smaller, being slightly below 0.1.
7 Counterfactual analysis of the e¤ects of policy reforms
The eligibility e¤ects on the odds of the transition rates discussed above are informative about the
importance of the availability of di¤erent early retirement schemes, but their magnitude is di¢ cult
to interpret in terms of quantities of interest from the policy point of view. In particular, it is not
easy to say whether a given policy reform has been economically important or not based on the
eligibility e¤ects on the odds ratios. Therefore, the policy e¤ects are studied by comparing cumu-
lative exit probabilities and the expected duration of the remaining employment career associated
with di¤erent counterfactual policy designs for workers born in 1947 or 1948 who were included in
the estimation sample (6324 individuals). These two cohorts are chosen because they have been
a¤ected by all the reforms investigated in this study. The question addressed is how this group
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would have behaved had they been covered by a given combination of the early retirement rules.
The starting point is the eligibility rules that were in force in the mid-1990s. The reforms are
then introduced one by one, eventually leading to the set of eligibility rules that these individuals
actually faced. More precisely, the following counterfactual policy regimes are considered:
0. The old rules that were in force in 1996: the age thresholds of 53, 58 and 56 for extended
unemployment benets, IER pension benets and part-time pension benets, respectively.
1. Rules 0, but the eligibility age for the extended unemployment benets raised by two years
from 53 to 55 (the 1997 reform).
2. Rules 1, but the IER scheme abolished (the 2000 reform).
3. Rules 2, but the eligibility age for the part-time pension raised by two years from 56 to 58
(the 2003 reform). These are the rules the workers born in 1947 and 1948 actually faced.
The analysis is based on the logit specication with the heterogeneous policy e¤ects (i.e. the
parameter estimates in table 3). For worker i who has been employed from age 49 to 51, the
probability of being still employed at age a 2 [52; 63] under policy regime p 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g is given
by the survival function
Spi (a) =
Z Ya 1
l=51
hpiE (l jvi)

 (vi) dvi: (7)
In the computations, worker is covariates Xia are xed at their initial values at age 51 (except a
dummy for short job tenure), whereas the age patterns of the eligibility dummies, Earlyia; IERia;
PTPia and UTia; and their interactions with the relevant covariates are chosen to be consistent with
a given policy regime. There are no anticipatory e¤ects, so that the results describe the permanent
policy e¤ects. The integral terms are approximated using the same simulation technique as was
applied in the simulated maximum likelihood estimation.
The expected age of exit from employment under policy p for worker i is computed as
Ep(Ai) =
Z  65X
l=51
(l + 1=2)

1  hpiE (l jvi)

Spi (ljvi)
!
 (vi) dvi: (8)
The logit model describes the probability that the worker exits from employment by age a + 1
conditional on being employed at age a. It follows that the worker can be either a or a+1 years old
on the day when she left her job, and thereby the exit age in the equation above is set to a+ 1=2
when the exit occurs between ages a and a + 1. Moreover, since the transition rate estimates are
only available up to age 62, it is assumed that hpiE (63 jvi) = hpiE (62 jvi) and hpiE (64 jvi) = 0. The
latter assumption ignores the possibility of postponing the old-age pension beyond age 65. Given
that the same assumptions are imposed in all cases, they should not signicantly distort di¤erences
in the expected exit ages associated with di¤erent policy regimes.
The e¤ect of policy reform p  1 compared to the counterfactual level under policy regime
p  1 can be measured as Spi (a)  Sp 1i (a) and Ep(Ai)  Ep 1(Ai) for worker i: The sum of these
e¤ects over reforms 1, 2 and 3 gives the joint e¤ect of all the three reforms compared with the
counterfactual case of the mid-1990s rules. Note the survival function and the expected exit age
are two sides of the same coin: they both describe the expected remaining time in employment. In
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particular, they are both solely determined by the likelihood of staying employed for one additional
year, hpiE (a jvi) ; and thereby they do not contain information about the relative importance of
di¤erent exit pathways. Therefore, cumulative incidence functions (CIF) are also computed. The
CIF for state j under policy p is dened as
F pij(a) =
Z  a 1X
l=51
hpij (l jvi)Spi (ljvi)
!
 (vi) dvi; (9)
and it gives the probability of having exited from employment to state j by age a 2 [52; 63]. Because
Spi (a) = 1 
P
k F
p
ik(a), the e¤ects of policy reform p in terms of changes in CIFs, F
p
ij(a) F p 1ij (a),
j = U;D;O, provide a useful decomposition for the overall e¤ect on the survival probability.
Using the estimated parameters from the logit model, the cumulative incidence and survival
rates as well as the expected exit ages are computed for all those born in 1947 or 1948 under the
di¤erent policy regimes. The average values of individual-specic survival and cumulative incidence
functions (i.e. the marginal curves) are depicted in gure 4. The marginal CIFs give the predicted
shares of people escaping from employment via the various exit pathways by a given age, whereas
the marginal survival rate gives the predicted share of those remaining employed until a given
age. Discrepancies in the curves associated with the di¤erent policy regimes describe the policy
e¤ects on the cumulative ows out of employment. Tables 4 and 5 provide additional information.
The rst column of table 4 shows the policy e¤ects on the expected exit age. The other columns
show the policy e¤ects on the survival rate and CIFs at age 63. The average e¤ects correspond
to the di¤erences in the last values of the marginal curves in gure 4. To illustrate a degree of
heterogeneity in the policy e¤ects across individuals, the 10th and 90th percentiles along with the
median e¤ects are also reported in table 4. Furthermore, table 5 reports the mean characteristics
of individuals at the lower and upper end of the distributions of the policy e¤ects on the expected
exit age. The rst decile includes one-tenth of workers whose exit age was subject to the smallest
change due to a given reform and the tenth decile one-tenth of those who were subject to the largest
change.
The logit estimates indicate that the two-year increase in the age threshold for the UT scheme
in 1997 notably reduced the odds of becoming unemployed at ages 52 and 53.9 Consequently, the
cumulative probability of entering unemployment under policy regime 1 lies at a lower level than
in the pre-reform case in gure 4b. The di¤erence declines with age, so that the mean e¤ect on the
cumulative incidence of unemployment at age 63 is only  0:01 (see panel A in table 4). Moreover,
the overall mean e¤ect on the likelihood of surviving employed until that age is practically zero
(0:002) due to the slightly increased cumulative risks of disability retirement and non-participation.
Since UT eligibility has no signicant spillover e¤ects on the odds of exiting via other exit rates
(see table 3), these increases are largely driven by the dynamic selection process: when the workers
likelihood of becoming unemployed decreases at a given age, he is more likely to be employed at
older ages and, hence, at higher risk of entering other states than unemployment. As seen in panel A
of table 4, the mean duration of the employment career has increased by 1.3 months ( 120:109)
due to the two-year increase in the age threshold of the UT scheme. This e¤ect also varies across
individuals, as the e¤ect increases from 0.029 to 0.201 from the 10th to 90th percentile. It turns
9The reform also increased the transition rate out of unemployment among 53-54-year-old job seekers (Kyyrä
and Wilke, 2007, and Kyyrä and Ollikainen, 2008). Since the possibility of re-employment is ignored here, the
counterfactual analysis somewhat understates the overall employment e¤ect of the UT reform.
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Figure 4: Marginal survivor and cumulative incidence functions for 1947 and 1948 cohorts under
di¤erent pension schemes
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out that many educated women in the public sector were hardly a¤ected by the reform, as they
dominate the rst decile of the impact distribution (see table 5). The employment careers of male
manufacturing workers were subject to the largest increases. In particular, 97% of individuals in
the tenth decile of the policy e¤ect distribution work in the manufacturing sector. This is not
surprising, as the overall risk of unemployment is clearly highest for manufacturing workers (see
table 3).
Turning to the next reform, abolishing the IER scheme has reduced the odds of being granted
a disability pension after age 57, resulting in a substantial reduction in the cumulative incidence
of disability retirement at older ages (gure 4c). The likelihood of having left employment for
disability pension benets by age 63 was reduced by 0.051 compared with the counterfactual level
with the IER scheme available at age 58 (panel B in table 4). In relative terms, this reduction is as
much as one-fourth. The overall e¤ect on the likelihood of staying employed is almost equally large,
being 0.046 at age 63. This results in an increase of 3.4 months ( 12 0:284) in the average exit
age. The average e¤ect masks a large degree of heterogeneity between individuals. Abolishing the
IER scheme has lengthened the expected employment career by 6.2 months ( 12 0:517) or more
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Table 4: Distributions of policy e¤ects
E(A) S(63) Fu(63) Fd(63) Fo(63)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reference level (regime 0) 59:595 0:239 0:253 0:188 0:320
A. 2-year increase in UT age limit (from regime 0 to 1)
Mean 0:109 0:002  0:010 0:003 0:004
10% percentile 0:029 0:001  0:014 0:001 0:003
Median 0:111 0:002  0:010 0:003 0:005
90% percentile 0:201 0:004  0:005 0:006 0:006
B. Abolition of IER scheme (from regime 1 to 2)
Mean 0:284 0:046 0:002  0:051 0:004
10th percentile 0:138 0:015  0:014  0:071  0:072
Median 0:239 0:038 0:005  0:053 0:008
90th percentile 0:517 0:094 0:013  0:030 0:066
C. 2-year increase in PTP age limit (from regime 2 to 3)
Mean  0:069  0:004 0:007  0:003  0:001
10th percentile  0:130  0:007 0:002  0:005  0:007
Median  0:070  0:003 0:005  0:003  0:001
90th percentile  0:013  0:001 0:015 0:000 0:006
D. Joint e¤ect of 3 reforms (from regime 0 to 3)
Mean 0:324 0:045  0:002  0:051 0:007
10th percentile 0:152 0:015  0:022  0:069  0:074
Median 0:342 0:038  0:002  0:052 0:014
90th percentile 0:478 0:089 0:020  0:030 0:072
Notes: Reference level is the level under old rules in force in 1996.
for one-tenth of people, whereas the e¤ect was 1.7 months ( 12  0:138) or less for another one-
tenth (panel B in table 4). This heterogeneity stems from di¤erent responses towards transitions
to unemployment and non-participation, as the 10th and 90th percentiles of the changes in the
cumulative incidences of unemployment and non-participation at age 63 are of opposite signs. As
seen in table 5, this reform had the strongest impact on educated women in the public sector, while
having very little e¤ect on educated men in the private sector.
The last reform the two-year increase in part-time pension eligibility increased the likelihood
of entering unemployment (gure 4b), but decreased the likelihood of being granted a disability
pension and that of exiting to non-participation (gures 4c and 4d). But all these e¤ects are very
small, being close to zero on average. As a result, the average survival rate was hardly a¤ected,
and the average drop in the expected exit age was less than one month (panel C in table 4). The
e¤ects of this reform do not exhibit much variation across individuals either. For the one-tenth of
the population most strongly a¤ected, the expected age of exit was reduced by 1.5 months or more.
A common characteristic for individuals in this group is high education (see table 5). Overall, the
two-year increase in part-time pension eligibility has relatively moderate e¤ects on all individuals.
It should be stressed that part-time pensioners are counted as employed. Although the reform
has slightly lowered the average age of exit from employment, it has also reduced transitions from
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Table 5: Mean characteristics of workers in the 1st and 10th deciles of the distributions of policy
e¤ects on the expected age of exit from employment
2-yr increase in Abolition of 2-yr increase in Joint e¤ect of
UT age limit IER scheme PTP scheme 3 reforms
1st 10th 1st 10th 1st 10th 1st 10th
log (unemployment rate)  2:099  1:525  1:965  1:977  1:768  1:879  1:950  1:924
Female 0:647 0:289 0:002 1:000 0:515 0:137 0:037 1:000
Married 0:895 0:571 0:857 0:791 0:707 0:788 0:862 0:756
Years of education 1:884  0:823 2:264 1:736 3:388  0:855 3:841 0:646
log (earnings) 0:118 0:338 0:777 0:264 0:168 0:633 0:593 0:234
Tenure < 2 years 0:060 0:023 0:077 0:031 0:056 0:063 0:069 0:026
Public sector 0:936 0:000 0:024 1:000 0:319 0:244 0:258 0:990
Manufacturing 0:016 0:971 0:219 0:000 0:165 0:329 0:130 0:010
Trade 0:010 0:008 0:235 0:000 0:110 0:119 0:150 0:000
Transportation 0:006 0:003 0:042 0:000 0:053 0:093 0:042 0:000
Services 0:008 0:018 0:259 0:000 0:205 0:088 0:217 0:000
Other sector 0:024 0:000 0:221 0:000 0:148 0:127 0:203 0:000
Mean e¤ect on E(A) 0:020 0:218 0:053 0:534  0:162 0:017 0:059 0:510
full-time to part-time work among workers aged 56 and 57, which does not show up here. It follows
that the part-time pension reform has almost surely increased the total number of hours worked.
The joint e¤ect of all the three reforms in panel D in table 4 suggests that the expected age at
which workers leave employment was increased by some 3.9 months ( 12 0:324). Since the 10th
percentile of the joint e¤ect is 1.8 months ( 12 0:152), the series of policy reforms has basically
induced all groups of workers to work longer. For one-tenth of the most strongly a¤ected workers,
the increase is about half a year or more. This group consists solely of female public servants. It
is evident that abolition of the IER scheme is responsible for much of the overall increase in the
length of employment careers, but the UT reform has also played an important role in postponing
exits from employment.
8 Concluding remarks
This study quanties the e¤ects of the reforms that altered the eligibility age thresholds of two early
retirement schemes and tightened medical criteria for disability pension benets. The three reforms
together have raised the average age at which older people leave employment by 3.9 months. The
expected exit age has increased in all worker groups due to the reforms, even though the size of
the e¤ect varies across the groups. The likelihood of being granted a disability pension by age 63
has decreased on average by 5.1 percentage points compared with the counterfactual case of the
mid-1990s rules, which is a drastic drop. Although the cumulative incidence of unemployment at
age 63 has hardly changed, those who enter unemployment do so typically at a later point in their
employment career. As a result, the average duration of unemployment among older people has
declined, even though a high incidence of unemployment remains a serious problem for the oldest
people in the labour market.
Of the three reforms, the most e¤ective one was the abolition of the IER scheme. It led to
an increase of 3.4 months in the average age of exit from employment. This average e¤ect masks
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a large degree of impact heterogeneity, which stems from variation in the spillover e¤ects across
individuals. The one-tenth of the most strongly responded workers, for whom the e¤ect was half
a year or more, consist solely of female public servants, whereas many highly educated men in the
private sector were hardly a¤ected by the reform. The UT reform has increased the average exit
age by 1.3 months, which amounts to one-third of the overall e¤ect of all the reforms. Unlike the
other two reforms, the increase in the age threshold of the part-time pension scheme has induced
some people to advance, albeit only marginally, the day when they withdraw from employment
altogether. But, despite the small negative e¤ect on the average exit age, it is likely that the
reform led to an increase in e¤ective labour supply as measured by hours worked. This is because
the part-time pension induces full-time workers to switch to being part-timers.
The empirical results imply the following policy recommendations. First, the stringency of
medical criteria for disability pension eligibility should be tough enough. If non-medical factors
carry large weight at the expense of medical criteria, disability pension benets may distort labour
supply decisions, inducing workers who are not truly disabled to retire via disability programmes.
This claim relies on the large average e¤ect of the abolition of the IER scheme. By implication,
tightening medical criteria for disability benet eligibility may be an e¤ective policy for countries
where such criteria are relatively weak. But one cannot take this policy recommendation for granted,
as the results of Karström et al. (2008) and Staubli (2009) point to important spillover e¤ects for
similar reforms in Sweden and Austria. It is likely that the e¤ectiveness of disability benet reforms
depends crucially on the ease of access to alternative benets, which varies from country to country.
Second, given that UT eligibility has no spillover e¤ects on the odds of entering other states than
unemployment, additional restrictions on the UT scheme should provide a means of keeping certain
groups employed at older ages. Such measures are likely to a¤ect disproportionately worker groups
with a high layo¤ risk, such as workers with low education in the manufacturing sector. Finally,
the design of the part-time pension scheme should be carefully reconsidered. In its current shape,
the part-time pension scheme subsidizes reductions in working time rather generously, without
lengthening employment careers signicantly. As a consequence, it probably reduces e¤ective labour
supply, even though the purpose is the opposite. However, this conclusion relies on the eligibility
e¤ect (not the e¤ect of the actual receipt of a part-time pension) identied from behaviour at ages
56 and 57, and hence should be treated with some caution. On the other hand, it is in accordance
with the ndings of Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2006)
It is noteworthy that, more recently, the eligibility rules of the UT and part-time pension
schemes have been tightened further for people born in the 1950s or later. Namely the government
has raised the age threshold for extended unemployment benets by an additional two years for
people born between 1950 and 1954 and by three years for later cohorts.10 The age threshold for
the part-time pension has been increased by two years for those born after 1952. It is of obvious
interest to say something about the likely e¤ects of these changes. To give at least a rough estimate,
the counterfactual analysis is extended (from regime 3) by exposing workers born in 1947 and 1948
to these additional reforms. The age threshold of the UT scheme is rst increased from 55 to 57
as a fourth reform (these rules apply to 1950-52 cohorts in reality). Then the age threshold of the
10 It should be stressed that the unemployment pension has been abolished and replaced by an additional extension of
unemployment benets until the old-age pension. This change probably does not have large behavioural implications
because the di¤erence between the unemployment pension benet and preceding earnings-related unemployment
benet has been relatively small on average. In any case, the possible e¤ect is ignored below.
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part-time pension is increased from 58 to 60 (1953-54 cohorts) as a fth reform. Finally, the age
threshold of the UT scheme is raised by one additional year to 58 (1955 cohort and later ones) as a
sixth reform. This exercise points to an overall increase of 1.5 months in the average exit age due
to the additional three reforms. More precisely, the exit age is increased by 1.7 and 0.8 months due
to the two- and one-year increases in the age threshold of the extended unemployment benets,
respectively. These e¤ects are attenuated by a reduction of 0.9 months due to the part-time pension
reform.
In summary, these six reforms to the early retirement schemes are estimated to induce workers
to stay in work by about half a year longer on average. In addition, the changes in the part-time
pension scheme are likely to increase the hours worked at the end of careers. These estimates do
not, however, contain the impact of the large pension reform in 2005. Since that reform took e¤ect
quite recently and it also includes various safeguard clauses, its implications have not been subject
to any microeconometric evaluations so far. But, using a numerical life-cycle model, Hakola and
Määttänen (2007) end up with an ex ante estimate that the 2005 reform as a whole will postpone
labour market withdrawals by slightly more than half a year. It should be emphasized that this
estimate also includes the e¤ect of the increase in the age threshold for the extended unemployment
benets to 57, which was already accounted for in the estimates above. All things considered, it
seems that the common goal of raising the e¤ective retirement age by no less than three years by
2025 is still far way, even though general improvements in health may do part of the job in the
longer run.
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